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I. Introduction  
 
Last week the D.C. Circuit invalidated an important Federal Communications Commission order. 
No, not the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, which has been pending since February and has 
kept telecom nerds like me glued to the court’s website every Tuesday and Friday morning. In 
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma v. Federal Communications 
Commission, the court vacated portions of the Commission's Accelerating Wireless Broadband 
Deployment Order governing 5G deployment.
1
 The court found that the Commission’s decision 
to exempt small cell deployment from the environmental and historic preservation review 
processes that accompany larger tower deployments was arbitrary and capricious.
2
 This doctrine 
is designed to assure that orders are supported by “reasoned decisionmaking,” a low bar that (it 
seems to me) the 66-page Order should have cleared. The decision also represents a setback to 
the Commission’s ongoing efforts to promote 5G deployment. 
 
II. The 5G Deployment Order 
 
The challenged Accelerating Wireless Broadband Deployment Order exempted small cell 
construction from the historic and environmental review processes that attach to certain federal 
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projects. The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) requires certain review procedures for 
federal “undertakings,” while the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) applies to any 
“major Federal action.”3 Facially, these acts do not apply directly to most private wireless 
infrastructure projects. With rare exceptions, the Commission does not require construction 
permits prior to building individual wireless facilities, meaning such projects are not federal 
“undertakings” or “actions” triggering review.4  
 
But the Court has recognized a “limited approval authority” allowing the Commission to require 
such review indirectly, through the Title III licensing process.
5
 Although a provider can construct 
a wireless facility without federal approval, it cannot operate a wireless network without a 
spectrum license, which the Commission issues based on the public interest. Historically, the 
Commission has required licensees to undertake NHPA and NEPA review of construction 
projects as a condition of receiving a spectrum license, although it has also created a long list of 
exceptions and exclusions for deployments unlikely to have cultural or environmental effects.
6
 
The Order in question effectively added a small cell exemption to that list by exempting such 
deployments from its limited approval authority if they involve antennas less than three cubic 
feet in volume and associated equipment less than 28 cubic feet in volume, and are mounted on 
towers no taller than 50 feet or 110 percent of the height of adjacent structures.
7
 
 
The Commission created this exemption because, in its judgment, the costs of this review 
outweighed the benefits and were likely to delay 5G deployment. Unlike traditional wireless 
facilities, small cells are, well, small – the Commission describes them as “pizza-box sized, 
lower-powered antennas,” the bulk of which are likely to be installed on pre-existing structures.8 
Therefore, small cells are much less likely to raise environmental or historical preservation 
concerns than macro towers that provide 3G and 4G connectivity, which can reach up to 300 feet 
high.
9
 At the same time, 5G deployment will require between 10 and 100 times more antenna 
locations than previous generation networks.
10
 The record showed that 29 percent or more of 
wireless deployment costs were due to NEPA and NHPA review when required. Based on these 
findings, the Commission concluded that mechanically applying existing review obligations to 
small cell deployment would impose unnecessary costs and interfere with the Commission’s 
statutory obligation to support “the development and rapid deployment of new 
technologies…without administrative or judicial delays” and “encourage the deployment on a 
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all 
Americans…by…remov[ing] barriers to infrastructure investment.”11  
 
III. The Court Decision 
 
Opponents challenged the Commission’s Order as arbitrary and capricious under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (sometimes called the “hard look” doctrine). “To survive arbitrary 
and capricious review, an agency action must be the product of reasoned decisionmaking.”12 
This test is “fundamentally deferential”:13 the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he scope of 
review… is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”14 Rather, 
the court’s job is to assure that the agency “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found 
and the choice made.’”15 A decision is arbitrary or capricious if it “entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
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evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.”16 Nonetheless, the court will “uphold a decision of less 
than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”17 
 
Here, the Commission’s logic was clear. Its limited review authority is a function of its Title III 
obligations to grant spectrum licenses in the public interest. The existing historic and 
environmental review policies were last modified in an era of 3G and 4G macrotowers, large 
arrays of antennas that rise several hundred feet into the air several miles apart. Those policies 
should not apply the same way to 5G small cells, which bear little resemblance to these 
behemoths. As the Commission explained in its brief, small cells are more like backyard satellite 
dishes or roof-mounted home television antennas, which are not subject to federal review. Given 
the smaller footprint of small cells, the large cost that these reviews can impose on deployment, 
and the fact that small cell deployment will exceed macrotower deployment by an order of 
magnitude, the Commission determined that the public interest calculation did not warrant 
similar review obligations. The rules governing deployment of 50,000 200-foot macrotowers 
should be different than those governing deployment of 800,000 pizza-box-sized antennas. 
Applying old rules to new technology imposes regulatory compliance costs that undercut the 
Commission’s responsibility “to promote the rapid development and deployment of new 
technologies.” 
 
The court recognized this explanation but found that the agency did not adequately consider 
three factors. First, while small cells are much smaller in size than macro towers, they will be 
much larger in number, and though most will be collocated on existing facilities, 5G deployment 
will still involve perhaps 160,000 new facilities, which could be up to 50 feet high (or more in 
areas where adjacent facilities are taller) and therefore would likely have some impact on the 
environment and on historic preservation.
18
 Second, many small cell deployments will fall under 
existing exclusions, which reduces the agency’s estimated regulatory burden.19 And finally, the 
agency gave little attention to the benefits of environmental and historical preservation review 
and failed to consider the alternatives of retaining or streamlining the review rather than 
eliminating it.
20
 
 
Of course, there is no clear, bright line about how “hard” an agency has to look at a problem to 
satisfy “hard look” review. And that means reasonable minds can differ about whether particular 
agency decisions are sufficiently justified. But my sense is that the court gave the Commission 
less credit than it was due.  
 
First, the agency was not blind to the fact that 5G deployment would involve significant new 
construction. Quite the contrary: the fact that NEPA/NHPA review costs would be multiplied by 
potentially hundreds of thousands of new deployments was a key factor in its cost-benefit 
calculation.
21
 Significantly, the Commission recognized, in paragraph 77, that to the extent that 
particular small cell deployments will raise local concerns, “nothing we do in this order 
precludes any review conducted by other authorities – such as state or local authorities – insofar 
as they have review processes encompassing small wireless facility deployments.”22 And, of 
course, this local review could address both harms from new construction as well as the potential 
cumulative harm of densification. Consistent with basic federalism principles, the Commission 
endorsed this local review as a gap-filler: “The existence of state and local review procedures, 
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adopted and implemented by regulators with more intimate knowledge of local geography and 
history, reduces the likelihood that small wireless facilities will be deployed in ways that will 
have adverse environmental and historic preservation effects.”23 The Court never addresses this 
rationale, or the value of state and local review, in its decision. 
 
Second, the Commission’s estimates of review costs does take into account the likelihood that 
many, likely most, small cell deployments already fall under an exemption. To justify its cost 
calculations, the Commission cited a report prepared by Accenture Strategy, prepared for CTIA, 
which showed that “29 percent of wireless deployment costs are related to NHPA/NEPA 
regulations when reviews are required.”24 Although the emphasis is mine, the italicized portion 
shows the Commission recognizes not all small cell deployments would require review. The 
Accenture report, in turn, relied on historic data to estimate that only 28 percent of new small 
cell deployments would require review.
25
 The Order cites this report to support its claim that 
NEPA/NHPA costs would rise to $241 million in 2018.
26
 And Commissioner Carr’s concurring 
statement cited this study to show that the Order would save $1.56 billion in review costs 
through 2026.
27
 While the Court called out the Commission’s admittedly loose language at times 
– such as complaining about the “mechanical application” of review to “each of these small 
deployments,”28 the financial figures cited in the Order do reflect the likelihood that most 
deployments are already exempt from review. 
 
Finally, the Order did consider the record evidence supporting the benefits of NEPA/NHPA 
review. As the court noted, the Commission acknowledged those commenters who supported 
review and noted that these comments were either general, anecdotal, or at most showed a very 
small impact. The Texas Historical Commission, for example, showed 0.25 percent of projects 
were found to have adverse effects since 2014, which corresponds with Verizon’s representation 
that 0.3 percent of Tribal review requests resulted in an adverse finding, and the Association for 
American Railroads’ representation that 99.6 percent of deployments pose no risk to historic, 
tribal, or environmental interests.
29
 While the court cites Michigan v. EPA to find the 
Commission did not engage in reasoned decisionmaking, that case was distinguishable. In that 
case, the agency explicitly “gave cost no thought at all, because it considered cost irrelevant” to 
its decision.
30
 Here, the agency recognized comments favoring the benefits of review but found 
them outweighed by the costs. 
 
The court correctly notes that the Order does not take into account the number of adverse effects 
that are mitigated by the review process or deterred by the existence of federal review. But it 
appears there is no record evidence to quantify this benefit. Even assuming that successful 
mitigation/deterrence is ten times the total number of adverse findings, that would mean 3.3 
percent of all cases raise some concern, which would not undermine the Commission’s findings 
that the benefits of review are de minimis. Furthermore, the Commission explained, “even 
if…the aggregated effects of small wireless facility deployment rendered the benefits of review 
more than de minimis, we nonetheless determine that those benefits would be outweighed by the 
detrimental effects of the roll-out of advanced wireless service.”31 Given the record evidence that 
such costs could reach $1.56 billion by 2026, and in light of the Commission’s acknowledgement 
that state and local review remain available to address residual concerns, this conclusion does not 
seem arbitrary and capricious. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
The decision was not all bad news for the Commission. The court affirmed other parts of the 
Order, including recognition that upfront fees charged by some tribes for initial historic review 
determinations are voluntary in nature, and a revised shot clock for tribes to respond to 
notifications made through the Tower Construction Notification System. And, of course, the 
Commission has the option to adopt a new rulemaking that addresses the deficiencies identified 
by the court (though this would not address petitioners’ claims that NEPA and NHPA require 
review, a question the court declined to answer). 
 
Nonetheless, the re-imposition of environmental and historic review deals a blow to the 
Commission’s ongoing efforts to promote 5G deployment. The Accelerating Wireless 
Broadband Deployment Order was a key part of a larger package of initiatives designed to 
secure America’s leadership in the upcoming wireless revolution. The court’s decision will 
increase costs and slow the pace of next-generation wireless deployment at a time when all five 
Commissioners recognize that the country is at risk of falling behind. 
 
With so much at stake, it is surprising that the court invalidated the agency’s common-sense 
recognition that a regulatory regime designed to mitigate the impact of tall, low-density towers 
could impede construction of high-density small cell networks. Of course, robust judicial review 
is an essential component of agency decisionmaking. As I noted above, reasonable minds may 
differ regarding whether an agency adequately explained its thinking. After all, one can always 
imagine some argument that the Commission did not adequately address. And in an era of 
thousands of electronic comments, it’s also not hard to find such arguments hidden somewhere 
in the record.
32
 But arbitrary and capricious review is meant to test the adequacy of the agency’s 
explanation. Here, it seems, the court understood the agency’s rationale; it just was not 
convinced by it. 
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, a Professor of Law at Boston College, is a Member of the Free State 
Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an independent, 
nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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